The Model

Technology, Preferences and Endowments
The model has one period and two countries, 1 and 2. In each country a single factor, labour, can produce a single good with a constant returns to scale production function: y = n, where y denotes units of output and n denotes units of labour. The price of the good is normalised at 1.
The per capita endowments of the two countries are the same, and equal to n. If we allowed for different per capita incomes between the two countries, a centralised system that redistributes income across income classes would at the same time systematically transfer income between countries, from the richer one to the poorer one-an issue that is not the focus of this paper.
Individuals can belong to one of three income classes, A, B and C, characterised by endowments of labour nA, nB and nc respectively. For simplicity, the endowment of labour of an individual of, say, class A is the same in the two countries. The assumption of three income classes is also made only for convenience: its advantage is that it allows us to characterise the equilibrium as a function of two parameters, nA and nB (note that, given the per-capita income and the sizes of each class, nc is determined residually). Conceptually, the model can be easily generalised to the case of N classes, where N can be arbitrarily large, at the cost of a more frequent recourse to numerical solutions.2 Letting pi,j represent the fraction of the population in the income class i in country j, we assume that (i) pi,j<0.5Vi, j and (ii) nA< nB< n< nc.
Assumption (i) avoids trivial voting equilibria.
In what follows, only for simplicity and with no loss of generality we further assume that the three income classes are of equal size: pi,j = 1/3V i, j. Together with the first, assumption (ii) implies that in each country the median voter is a member of the income class B; furthermore, the distribution of endowments is skewed to the right, i.e. the median endowment is below the average. In addition to being empirically valid, this assumption implies that, given the fiscal system that we specify below, the median voter votes for a positive tax rate.
In order to avoid 'ties' in voting, the only asymmetry between the two countries is in the total mass of their population: the total mass is 1 + 6 in country 1 and 1 in country 2, with 6 being arbitrarily small. Without this assumption, the voting outcome would depend on the rules one assumes to break the ties: for instance, the average of the two tax rates, the status quo (O tax rate), etc. However, even in this case our results are robust to alternative assumptions about how ties are broken. 3 An individual of type i in country j has a concave utility function U( Ci,j). We illustrate our model using a quadratic utility function, which allows us to 2 It is more difficult to find an analytical solution when the distribution of endowments is continuous. The reason is that, as we show below, the tax rate in the centralised regime is in general the ratio of two random variables that are functions of the median and the average of a function of the original distribution. All these functions are extremely difficult to determine analytically, and we have not been able to find a distribution that lends itself to an analytical solution in this context.
Results are available upon request.
provide an analytic solution of the model. We also briefly summarise the case of a constant relative risk aversion utility function. More details on this case, solved by simulation, are available in the working paper version. Finally, in order to avoid strategic issues in the choice of the tax rate and problems of tax competition, we assume that individuals are not mobile across countries.
The Productivity Shock
The only source of uncertainty in the model is a country-specific productivity shock, c6, j = 1, 2. The shocks in the two countries have 0 mean, the same variance a2, and covariance a,.
The shock is multiplicative and affects all agents in a country in the same proportion. Thus, when country j is hit by the shock cj, an individual of type i effectively provides ni(1 + cj) units of labour. We refer to the quantity ni as the endowment of an individual of type i in country j, while the quantity ni(1 + cj) denotes his income. Therefore, the realised average income of country j is -1 ? c ij).
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy consists of a proportional income tax, at rate t, whose proceeds are redistributed lump-sum to all individuals.4 We study the trade-off between two aspects of this redistributive policy: its role in decreasing the uncertainty of the economic environment by sharing risk among individuals and countries, and its role in creating uncertainty due to the endogeneity of the policy instrument.
Taxation is distortionary. When the total taxable income is X and the tax rate is t, the total tax revenues that can be redistributed are (t -I t2) X: the quantity 2 t2 X is wasted in the process of collecting taxes or redistributing them.5 As we show later, this assumption implies that the tax rate preferred by each individual is a continuous function of his endowment.
The tax rate is chosen by majority voting. Our main goal is to study the impact of different fiscal policy arrangements on the two effects of redistribution that we highlighted above, the uncertainty-enhancing and uncertaintyreducing effect. In particular, we focus on two arrangements, that we define as follows:
Decentralised fiscal policy: each country runs its own programme, by taxing its own citizens and redistributing the proceeds lump-sum to them. In each country, the tax rate is chosen by majority voting. Centralised fiscal policy: the same tax rate applies to all the individuals of the two countries. The proceeds from taxation in the two countries are pooled and redistributed lump-sum to all individuals in the two countries. The common tax rate is decided by majority voting among the citizens of the two countries, voting together.
Voting on the tax rate takes place after the shock occurs. Two reasons justify this choice. First, if voting occurred before the shock is realised, the two countries would be identical ex-ante, generating uninteresting results. Second, even the second role of redistributive fiscal policy, sharing risk, makes sense only with this timing. A centralised system shares risk among countries because, when it redistributes income from rich individuals to poor individuals, indirectly it redistributes some income from the 'lucky' to the 'unlucky' country.6
If the shock were temporary and serially uncorrelated, in a dynamic version of this model a country could smooth out most of its effects by lending or borrowing on the world capital market. The mutual insurance afforded by a centralised system would be irrelevant. Issues of mutual insurance therefore become relevant only when the shock is permanent. The assumption that voting on tax rates occurs after the shock is precisely equivalent to considering 'large', permanent shocks, rather than shocks at the business cycle frequency. A major fiscal or financial crisis, a large supply shock that requires a major reallocation of resources and a large shift in the industrial structure, a monetary unification, a change in the exchange rate regime, etc., are all examples of the types of shock that we have in mind.
Absence of Private Insurance and of Direct Transfers
In our model, any insurance against fluctuations in income occurs through the same fiscal programme that redistributes income. In principle, however, individuals could insure themselves privately, without the intermediation of a programme that redistributes income across different groups. Alternatively, the two countries could agree on a system of direct transfers from the 'lucky' country to the 'unlucky' one.
In practice, there are a host of well-known reasons-from adverse selection to imperfect monitoring of outcomes-why private insurance schemes might not be viable. Similarly, it might be difficult for two governments to implement a direct system of mutual insurance through inter-country transfers. After the shock is realised, clearly the 'lucky' country stands to lose from the implementation of the agreement, and it has strong incentives to renegotiate it.
Clearly, the same problem arises even in the context of a centralised programme of inter-personal redistribution of income. By its nature, this programme also redistributes income from the lucky country to the unlucky one. However, because it also entails some interpersonal redistribution of 994 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [JULY resources, it might well obtain the support of a majority of agents even in the country that, on net, loses resources to the other country.7 Thus, for a variety of reasons, public redistributive programmes are widely regarded as having insurance properties against individual and country-specific shocks over and above whatever is provided by the market or other government insurance schemes.8
Equilibrium Fiscal Policy
The disposable income (which is equal to consumption in this static model) of an individual of type i in country j in the decentralised regime is: 
where the superscript c stands for 'centralised'. Expression (2) has the same interpretation as (1), except that now the tax base from which the subsidies are drawn is -ii(2 + c1 + 2). Also, in a centralised regime the total mass of recipients of the subsidy is now 2, i.e. all the individuals in the two countries, rather than 1. Expressions (1) and (2) highlight a crucial feature of our model: the two regimes affect the variability of consumption through their effects on the variability of the tax base and of the tax rate. We now study how these two components of the variability of consumption comnpare in the two regimes.
Decentralised Fiscal Policy
In a decentralised regime, each country decides by majority voting on its own tax rate. Since voting takes place after the shock has occurred, there is no uncertainty at the moment of voting: an agent of type i in country j prefers the tax rate td that maximises Cd? as given in expression ( 
The first term on the l.h.s. is the marginal cost of taxation: this cost is independent of the tax rate, but depends positively on the pre-tax income of an individual. The second term is the marginal benefit of an increase in taxation-i.e., the marginal increase in the subsidy-which decreases with the tax rate because of the convex costs of taxation. It follows that individuals with lower income will vote for a higher tax rate. However, individuals with income above the average always pay more in taxes than they receive as a subsidy. Thus, their preferred tax rate is always 0. Note that, because the tax rate is chosen after the shock, and the latter affects all individuals in the country in the same proportion, the ratio of individual i's income to the average income is independent of the shock. Consequently, each agent always prefers the same tax rate irrespective of the realisation of the shock. Since preferences are single-peaked, the policy preferred by the median voter, an individual of type B, prevails. Hence, the tax rate adopted in equilibrium is the same in both countries, and remembering that the median voter is an agent of type B, it is equal to td =1--.
(5) n Note that, on one hand, there is no uncertainty about policy: the tax rate is constant in all states of the world. On the other hand, the subsidy is stochastic because the tax base is; thus, by its nature a decentralised fiscal policy cannot provide any insurance against the only exogenous source of risk in this model, the country-specific shock c,.
Centralised Fiscal Policy
Consider now the voting process of the centralised regime. Individual i in country j prefers the tax rate t that maximises Cc as given in expression (2). Although the tax base is now independent of the shock, the income of individual i still depends on the shock. Thus, and in contrast to the decentralised regime, the tax rate that an individual prefers is now a function of the shock: The tax rate that prevails in the voting process is the one preferred by the individual with median pre-tax income in the combined population of the two countries. Who exactly this individual will be depends on the specific assumption one makes on the shape of the distribution of endowments, an issue that THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [JULY we explore in Section 4 below. However, one point is already clear from (6): in contrast to the decentralised regime, the tax rate in the centralised regime is stochastic, that is, it depends on the realisation of the shock. We can further clarify the difference between the two regimes, while at the same time greatly simplifying the analysis, by assuming that the productivity shocks in the two countries are perfectly negatively correlated: C1 = -2. Under this assumption the tax base in the centralised regime becomes deterministic and equal to 2-i, since: -ni(I + C-1) +-n(l + =-ni(I + cl) + -ni(l -l) = 2-n.
The assumption of perfect negative correlation between il and C2 is clearly extreme, and much stronger than we need in order to develop our argument. Its first advantage has to do with analytical tractability. As we have shown above, the tax rate resulting from the voting process is a function of the ratio of the median income to the average income. Our assumption then means that the denominator of this ratio in a centralised regime is always constant. This avoids having to deal with the ratio of two random variables, and greatly facilitates the analysis of the model. The second advantage of this assumption is that it highlights in a stark way the main differences between the decentralised and the centralised regime. Under this assumption the tax base in the centralised regime is constant, while the tax rate is stochastic. Hence, the centralised regime has opposite characteristics to the decentralised regime: it has no uncertainty on the tax base, but a higher uncertainty on the policy instrument.
In addition, note that this assumption does not bias the results in favour of decentralisation: in fact, the benefits and feasibility of mutual insurance are actually maximised when the productivity shocks are perfectly negatively correlated.
Economic Risk and Political Risk
The difference in the expected utility in the two regimes, E[ Ud'( td)]-E[U'(tc)], can be decomposed into three main components, each with an intuitive interpretation:9
E[ Ud(ttd)] -E[ Uc(t)] = {E[ Udl(td)] -E[ Uc(tYd)]} + ({E[ Ud(td)] -E[ Ud(td)]} (8) + {E[Uc(tc)] -E[UC(t )] ) + {E[UcC( d)] -E[Uc( t) ]}
For future reference, note that a positive value of the expected utility differential means that an individual is better off in the decentralised regime. 
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This decomposition is useful purely for expositional purposes. It identifies three components that have a natural interpretation. Obviously, nothing in our results depends on this or any other decomposition of this expression. The first component of (8) is equal to the difference in utility between the two regimes when the tax rate is held constant at its expected value in the decentralised regime, td (note that in this model td= -td since td is always constant; however, conceptually it is useful to distinguish between the two tax rates.) At this tax rate, the expected value of consumption is the same in the two regimes, but the variance is higher in the decentralised regime because the tax base is more variable. Therefore, the first component of our decomposition, E[ Ud(t)] -E[ Uc(td)], is negative and captures the difference between the two regimes that can be attributed to the different variability of their tax bases. We call this term the economic risk utility differential, since this is the component emphasised in the economics literature on fiscal unions, which typically does not consider political effects.
The second component of (8) Clearly, the first term in brackets in this expression is 0, since in the decentralised regime the equilibrium tax rate is constant. What is left in the expression then captures the fact that the higher diversity of voters in the centralised regime leads to a more variable tax rate than in the decentralised regime. Therefore, we call this component the political risk utility differential. Note that this component can be positive or negative, depending on the covariance of tc with the income of an individual.
Finally, the third component, E [ U c t7d) ] -E [ Uc (t ) ], captures the effects of systematic differences in the fiscal policies of the two countries. These can arise for instance because the median voters are different in the two regimes, and therefore the average tax rates that they prefer are different. Because different average degrees of redistributions are associated with different average tax rates, this component will be positive or negative, depending on the pre-tax income of an individual. We call this component the systematicfiscal policy utility differential.
To summarise, and recalling that td -d, we can define each of the three terms on the r.h.s. of (8) 
In other words, suppose that the total utility differential (the l.h.s. of (9)) is positive, but the sum of the economic risk utility differential and of the systematic utility differential (the l.h.s. of (10)) is negative. This implies that the individual prefers the decentralised regime (inequality (9)), but would prefer the centralised regime if the centralised tax rate did not vary about its expected value, that is, if there were no political risk (inequality (10)). In other words, the only reason why the individual prefers the decentralised regime is that the political risk is higher in the centralised regime, and this more than compensates for the effects of the other two factors. We can now anticipate the results that we will show in the next two sections:
There exists a non-empty set S of parameter values, including in particular income distribution values, such that a majority of individuals in each country prefer the decentralised regime only because of the higher political risk of the centralised regime. There exists a non-empty set S of parameter values for which a majority of voters in each country prefers the decentralised regime because of the combined effect of the political risk and the systematic utility differential; S C S.
We show below that the sets S and S are in fact quite wide and Result 1 does not have a 'knife edge' feature. In other words, for a wide range of parameter values both inequalities (9) and (10) are realised for a majority of individuals in each country. Because of the endogeneity of the policy instrument, the centralised regime might not be able to fulfill any insurance role. The 'political risk', namely the additional variability of the policy instrument in the centralised regime, for some parameter values more than compensates for the reduction in the 'economic risk', namely the reduction in the variability of the tax base in the centralised regime.
From Result 1, it follows immediately that for a wide range of parameter values at least one country will veto a centralised fiscal policy regime because of its higher political risk.
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Because the size of the political risk is a function of the variability of the tax rate, it is important to ask what are the conditions that are conducive to a higher variability of the tax rate. The answer is in the following definition and result:
For any given nB, a polarised distribution is characterised by a large distance between nA and nc.
Thus, according to Definition 3, an increase in polarisation, holding constant nB, corresponds to a mean-and median-preserving spread.
RESULT 2:
If, for a certain degree of polarisation, a majority of agents in each country prefer the decentralised regime, the centralised regime is not preferred by a majority for any higher level of polarisation.
In the next section we illustrate Results 1 and 2 for the case of equal expected equilibrium tax rates in the two regimes. This allows us to obtain a closed form solution of the model and prove our results analytically when the utility function is quadratic. In Section 5 we briefly discuss the more general case that does not impose any condition on the equilibrium tax rate, assuming a constant relative risk aversion utility function.
Before proceeding, it might be useful to repeat what we are trying to accomplish, and what we are not. We do not intend to show that centralisation is always inferior to decentralisation. What we want to show is that the 'mutual insurance' effect of centralisation can be partially, and even completely, compensated by a more dispersed distribution of preferences in a larger population. Since we are essentially developing a counterexample to the commonly held view that centralisation is superior because of the mutual insurance it provides, our argument can be made using a simple and very stylised model. Clearly, the results we obtain from this stylised model would be uninteresting if the range of parameter values for which the increase in political risk is greater than the reduction in economic risk is small or even 'knife-edge'. However, we show below that, in fact, this is not the case.
Quadratic Utility with Equal Expected Tax Rates
We consider the case when, in equilibrium, the average tax rates in the two regimes are equal: td = t. From Definition 2, any difference in their expected utility can then be attributed entirely to the relative importance of the economic risk and of the political risk. In other words, under the assumption of equal expected tax rates between the two regimes inequality (10) is always satisfied, since its l.h.s. represents the economic risk utility differential only. We know that the economic risk utility differential is always negative: if the tax rate were fixed at its common average value, every individual would certainly prefer the centralised regime. Therefore, if inequality (9) is realised and the individual prefers the decentralised regime, necessarily this must be because of the higher political risk in the centralised regime., i.e. because the policy instrument is more unpredictable.
For simplicity, we assume that the shock c can take only two values, x and -x, each with probability 0.5. If follows that there is only one possible configuration of parameters that deliver the condition of equality of the expected tax rates in the two regimes: This condition has a rather intuitive interpretation. Part (a) implies that the relative position of any two income groups in different countries is independent of the shock: for instance, when the shock is negative in country 1 and positive in country 2, the income of a member of group B in country 1 is still higher than the income of a member of group A in country 2. This ensures that the median voter in the centralised regime is always a member of group B in country 1, the larger country (obviously we could rewrite the conditions to make the median voter a member of group B in country 2).10 Part (b) requires that the tax rate proposed by the median voter is never 0. As we show below, this ensures that the tax rates proposed by the median voter in the centralised regime under the two realisations of the shock are symmetric about the decentralised tax rate, so that their average is exactly the decentralised tax rate.
Because the median voter is always a member of group B in country 1, and preferences are still single-peaked, the tax rate adopted in equilibrium, tc, is now:1l tr 1 nB(1 + (1) (2
The crucial result here is that the equilibrium tax rate is no longer constant: it covaries negatively with the shock in country 1. In fact, when cl is positive (negative), the income of the median voter, nB(l (l), is high (low), while as we know the average income of the two countries remains constant; thus, from (6), the tax rate preferred by the median voter is low (high). On the other hand, the tax base is constant.
Assume now that individuals maximise a utility function of the type: U(C.,1) aC-,1 --
l" Clearly, this is a special feattire of the model. More generally the shock might have distributtional implications, by changing relative positions in the income ladder of different individtials. This featture wotuld affect the variability of both the equiilibritum in the centralised and the decentralised regime. In general one cannot tell in which direction the difference in variability of tax rates in the two regimes (centralised and decentralised) wotuld be affected. Thuis, while the case considered here (for tractability reasons) is somewhat special, it does not necessarily bias the restults in favotur of decentralisation.
1 1 Recall that we have assumed for simplicity C I = -(2, so that the per capita income of the economies combined that appears at the denominator of (12) on the other hand, the political risk utility differential is unambiguously positive: E[ UC(tC)] > E[ UC( tc)] since the expected value of the subsidy in the centralised regime is higher and the variance is lower when the tax rate is constant at t' than when it depends on the shock.
The economic and political risk utility differentials therefore have opposite signs. To determine the sign of the overall utility differential, consider the variance and the expected value of the subsidy. Let s' and sd be the subsidy in the centralised and decentralised regimes, respectively. Some simple algebra shows that the expected value of the subsidy is always higher in the decentralised regime:
which simply reflects the fact that the increased variability of the tax rate in the centralised regime leads to higher deadweight losses. On the other hand, the variance of the subsidy in the two regimes depends on the value of nB:
Thus, the variance of the subsidy is higher in the centralised regime when nB> l/l3, and it is higher in the decentralised regime when nB <l3. Therefore, when nB > 1/Vi3, in the decentralised regime both the expected value of the subsidy is higher and its variance is lower. Conversely, when nB is below 1/O's, the variance of the subsidy is higher in the decentralised regime. Hence, for all values of nB higher than a certain value nB, (which in turn is less that 1/v3), in both countries members of group A with no labour endowment prefer the decentralised regime. Typically, the median income is above a fraction 1/ of the average income, and therefore, a fortiori, above nB,. Hence, for the more realistic values of the distribution of income, an individual with no labour endowment prefers the decentralised regime in both countries.
As the endowment of poor agents increases from 0, the importance of the subsidy as a source of consumption decreases while that of the after-tax earned THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [JULY income increases. As their endowment increases, individuals of type A in country 1 will be increasingly better off in the centralised regime, because the tax rate is countercyclical there and applies to a positive pre-tax income. Therefore, for any given nB individuals of type A with endowment lower than a certain value of nA prefer the decentralised regime in country 1.
Type-A individuals, country 2. Since the tax rate in the centralised regime is procyclical in country 2, poor agents in country 2 prefer the decentralised regime for an even wider range of values of nA. In fact, this is a general feature of the model: the range of parameter values such that individuals of any given type prefer the decentralised regime in country 1 is a subset of the same range in country 2. This is a consequence of the fact that the median voter is always in country 1. Thus, taxes are countercyclical in country 1 and procyclical in country 2.
In conclusion, there exists a wide range of configurations of the distribution of income, characterised by high values of nB and low values of nA, such that individuals of type A in both countries prefer the decentralised regime. In addition, this range is larger in country 2.
Type-B individuals, country 1. Individuals of type B in country 1 always prefer the centralised regime: indeed, they are always the decisive voters and therefore cannot do worse in the centralised regime, which has the same expected tax base but a lower variance.
Type-B individuals, country 2. As we discussed above, since the median voter is always in country 1, the range of parameter values for which a given type prefers decentralisation is always greater in country 2 than in country 1. This holds for both group A-as shown above-but also for group B. It follows that while group B in country 1 is always in favour of centralisation, for any parameter value, there exists a non empty set of parameter values for which group B in country 2 prefers decentralisation. Note that for the reason derived above (see equation (15) and the discussion associated with it) the region in which group B of country 2 prefers decentralisation is characterised by high values of nB.
Type-C individuals, country 1. Individuals of type C too are better off in the decentralised regime in a region characterised by high values of nB and low values of nA. The intuition is as follows. Using the expressions for the equilibrium tax rates, in the decentralised regime the after-tax earned income is (1 ?+))ne nB, while in the centralised regime it is (1 +? 1)2 nsnB.
1 Therefore, in the centralised regime the expected value of the after-tax earned income is larger, but on the other hand its variance is four times as large. Because with quadratic utility risk aversion increases with the level of consumption, i.e. with nB and nc, the higher nc and nB (therefore, the lower nA and the higher nB), the better off an individual of type Cwill be in the decentralised regime.
Type-C individuals, country 2. In country 2 there are two basic differences. First, now the after-tax earned incomes are (1 + 62) nc nB in the decentralised regime and (1 -x2) ncnB in the centralised regime.14 Hence, the expected value of the after-tax earned income is now higher in the decentralised regime, but its variance too is higher. Second, as usual the cyclical behaviour of the tax rate is more unfavourable in the centralised regime. As it turns out, this second effect more than offsets the effects of the higher variance of the after-tax earned income in the decentralised regime; as a result, individuals C in country 2 are better off in the decentralised regime for an even larger range of parameters than in country In addition, in this model where the expected tax rates are the same in the two regimes, the higher variability of the tax rate in the centralised regime unambiguously reduces the expected value of aggregate consumption by increasing the expected value of the costs of collecting or redistributing taxes.
RESULT 3:
In the centralised regime the expected aggregate consumption is lower, because the expected value of distortions is higher.
Proof:
Recalling that the average endowment in each economy is 1 by normalisation, the aggregate consumption of the two countries in each regime is 2[1-t' + (C -it')] = 2(1 -Vt), i = d, c. Because the average tax rates are the same in the two regimes but the variance is higher in the centralised regime, the result follows immediately.
Thus, this result highlights a sort of consumption inefficiency of the centralised regime.
Discussion and Conclusions
A rather unappealing feature of the quadratic utility function is that it implies increasing absolute risk aversion. However, our results do not hinge on this feature. In fact, we have also derived our conclusions for the case of the constant relative risk aversion utility function:
where y is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. With this utility function, in general it is not possible to solve our model analytically. Numerical simulations show that for a wide range of parameter values at least one country would veto the centralised regime: for a majority of its citizens, the increased political risk more than compensates the benefits of higher insurance.15 In summary, this paper has highlighted a simple trade-off. Fiscal integration in large political jurisdictions has its advantages: for example, economies of scale in the provision of public goods and the possibility of mutual insurance, which is the point emphasised in our paper. On the other hand, integration comes at a cost. The most general way of capturing this cost is the idea that, when the size of a political jurisdiction increases, policy becomes more uncertain because the outcome results from the aggregation of preferences of a more diverse population. The larger and more heterogeneous the political jurisdiction, the higher are these costs.
In our model we considered only two countries. What happens when the number of countries in the union increases? If we maintain the assumptions THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [JULY that all the countries have the same average endowment, that the systematic utility differential is 0, and that the relative income ranking of the three groups is not affected by the shock (condition (11)), then the variance of the tax rate decreases as the number of countries increases. However, the assumption of equal average endowments and of no systematic utility differentials become less and less tenable as the number of countries increases. For example, if the dispersion of average endowments increases with the number of countries, then the richer countries become more likely to object to a centralised system, for obvious reasons. In addition, in larger unions, more countries have a polarised distribution of income. This increases the political risk, and makes fiscal unions less likely to be beneficial to a majority of individuals. As we mentioned in the introduction, we believe that the basic idea of this paper extends beyond the specific case we have analysed. Expressed in more colourful terms than we used so far, this basic idea is that political integration, beyond the establishment of a free-trade regime, might backfire as the participating countries discover that they cannot agree on important common policies. The case of European integration is, perhaps, a good example. Supporters have often emphasised its economic benefits. Sceptics often mention the risk associated with integrating countries with important politicoeconomic differences. The point of this paper is, hopefully, to clarify in a unified framework one of the trade-offs leading to these conflicting views.
An important topic for future research is a 'normative' one, namely how to set up voting mechanisms which limit the effects of political risk but, at the same time, preserve the benefits of mutual insurance. In fact, it is conceivable that certain voting rules may be more effective than others in reducing (or eliminating) the political risk inherent in the centralised regime while at the same time allowing the participants to enjoy the advantages, in terms of reduced economic risk, of that regime. The next step therefore consists in studying how different voting rules may improve upon the trade-off between economic and political risk that we have emphasised in this paper.
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